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Introduction
Emerging infectious diseases present threats to global health.1 
The 2014–2016 Ebola virus disease outbreak in western 
Africa – caused by the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
strain – caught local and global health-care communities 
unaware and unprepared. By 2 September 2015, the outbreak 
had been associated with at least 28 073 confirmed, probable 
or suspected cases – reported in 10 countries – and more 
than 11 290 deaths.2 There were extraordinary challenges for 
the health-care systems and local governments involved in 
the response to the outbreak – and many of those challenges 
will persist long after the outbreak has passed.3 One such 
challenge was the safe disposal of potentially infected faecal 
and health-care waste – especially in the overcrowded urban 
communities where many of the cases occurred. It has been 
estimated that a patient in a bed within an African centre for 
Ebola treatment produced up to 300 litres of liquid waste and 
excreta per day.4 Every one of those litres could have been 
contaminated with Ebola virus5 and needed to be disposed 
of in such a way as to minimize the risks of transmission.6 
The safe disposal of waste that could harbour Ebola virus is 
particularly challenging when that waste has been produced 
beyond any formal health-care setting. In the three countries 
most affected by the recent outbreak – i.e. Guinea, Liberia and 
Sierra Leone – severe shortages of water and sanitation services 
in health-care facilities and the affected communities often 
complicated the safe disposal of waste. According to the most 
Objective To assess, within communities experiencing Ebola virus outbreaks, the risks associated with the disposal of human waste and 
to generate recommendations for mitigating such risks.
Methods A team with expertise in the Hazard Analysis of Critical Control Points framework identified waste products from the care of 
individuals with Ebola virus disease and constructed, tested and confirmed flow diagrams showing the creation of such products. After 
listing potential hazards associated with each step in each flow diagram, the team conducted a hazard analysis, determined critical control 
points and made recommendations to mitigate the transmission risks at each control point.
Findings The collection, transportation, cleaning and shared use of blood-soiled fomites and the shared use of latrines contaminated with 
blood or bloodied faeces appeared to be associated with particularly high levels of risk of Ebola virus transmission. More moderate levels 
of risk were associated with the collection and transportation of material contaminated with bodily fluids other than blood, shared use of 
latrines soiled with such fluids, the cleaning and shared use of fomites soiled with such fluids, and the contamination of the environment 
during the collection and transportation of blood-contaminated waste.
Conclusion The risk of the waste-related transmission of Ebola virus could be reduced by the use of full personal protective equipment, 
appropriate hand hygiene and an appropriate disinfectant after careful cleaning. Use of the Hazard Analysis of Critical Control Points 
framework could facilitate rapid responses to outbreaks of emerging infectious disease.
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recent data, nearly one third of health-
care facilities in Guinea, Liberia and 
Sierra Leone have no piped water, 22% 
have no improved sanitation and 40% 
have no system to manage health-care 
waste.7 The corresponding percentages 
for households within the same coun-
tries are probably higher.8
Most transmission of Ebola virus 
probably results from direct contact 
with the bodily fluids of people who 
are in the latter stages of Ebola virus 
disease.9,10 The survival time of the virus 
outside its human host is relatively short 
but – given the size and location of the 
recent outbreak and the frequent lack of 
disposal systems – we cannot exclude the 
possibility that, in some instances, people 
became infected indirectly, after coming 
into contact with contaminated waste.
In the present study, we used the 
Hazard Analysis of Critical Control 
Points framework to generate recom-
mendations for mitigating the risks 
posed by virus-contaminated waste 
within health-care facilities and commu-
nities experiencing outbreaks of Ebola 
virus disease. Although this framework 
was originally developed for food pro-
duction systems, it has been successfully 
adapted to manage and mitigate the risks 
associated with drinking water.11,12 It is 
increasingly being used to reduce the 
risks related to emerging infectious dis-
eases and other health threats.13 Since its 
use is both low-technology and relatively 
cheap, the framework may be particu-
larly useful in addressing the risks asso-
ciated with emerging infectious disease 
in areas where the capacity of existing 
health-care systems is insufficient to 
cope with the impact of the disease. 
The framework’s methods encourage 
the use of interdisciplinary expertise 
while enabling the rapid generation of 
evidence-based recommendations. It 
therefore offers the potential to manage 
risks when the quick control of an out-
break is essential even though – as with 
the survival of Ebola virus in sewage and 
other waste14 – the relevant research data 
are incomplete or can only be inferred. 
In our analyses, we defined waste 
as both human waste – e.g. faeces and 
urine – and the fomites generated by 
health-care activities. We identified 
those behaviours and practices linked 
to waste collection and disposal that 
are likely to present risks of direct or 
indirect transmission of Ebola virus 
between humans. We then evaluated 
the potential of assessments based on 
the Hazard Analysis of Critical Control 
Points framework as a response tool 
during outbreaks of emerging infec-
tious disease.
Methods
In conducting our Hazard Analysis of 
Critical Control Points analysis, we 
adapted the guidance contained within 
an annex to the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission’s General Principles of Food 
Hygiene.15 Although this guidance refers 
to 12 steps in the analysis, we ignored 
some of the later steps in the process 
because we would not ultimately be re-
sponsible for implementing the recom-
mended control measures or for estab-
lishing the subsequent on-the-ground 
monitoring. We used a seven-step 
process – similar to that used for highly 
pathogenic avian influenza.13 The seven 
steps were: (i) assemble a team with ap-
propriate expertise in Hazard Analysis 
of Critical Control Points analysis; 
(ii) identify waste products within the 
system of care of cases of Ebola virus 
disease; (iii) construct flow diagrams 
illustrating the system of care; (iv) test 
and confirm the accuracy of each flow 
diagram; (v) list potential hazards as-
sociated with each step in each flow 
diagram and conduct a hazard analysis; 
(vi) determine critical control points; 
and (vii) establish critical limits for each 
critical control point.
Team
The international and multidisciplinary 
nature of the problems posed by Ebola 
virus meant that we – i.e. the members of 
the research team – were obliged to con-
duct our analysis via a mixture of face-
to-face meetings and email exchanges. 
The research team included experts in 
disaster response, environmental health, 
Hazard Analysis of Critical Control 
Points protocols, infection control 
nursing, infectious disease epidemiol-
ogy, public health, risk assessment, 
small water systems, virology and water 
and sanitation engineering. The team 
members were drawn from 19 different 
institutional departments spread across 
multiple countries within Africa, Europe 
and North America. Our analysis began 
when team members from the Univer-
sity of East Anglia (Norwich, England) 
held a series of small meetings. The 
progress made in these meetings was 
then shared with a wider group of team 
members – for comment and feedback 
– before a two-day face-to-face meeting 
in Nairobi, Kenya, that was attended by 
all of the team members from Africa and 
several of those from Europe.
Process
In the analysis, a systematic approach that 
allows for the synthesis of expert opinion 
is combined with the available evidence. 
This can bring clarity in an otherwise 
complex public health system. In our 
early meetings we concentrated on defin-
ing the most important waste products 
– in terms of risk of transmission – and 
then creating initial flow diagrams repre-
senting the pathways that could be used 
for the collection and disposal of each of 
these waste products. The diagrams were 
then shared with other team members, by 
email – so that a wider group of experts 
could comment on them – before they 
were reviewed and simplified in a face-
to-face meeting. At the two-day meeting, 
experts from the fields of health interven-
tions, sanitation and wastewater hygiene 
gave their views on the flow diagrams. 
This review and a final critical analysis 
by an international panel of experts led to 
further modifications to – and simplifica-
tions of – the diagrams.
We considered a hazard to be a pro-
cess – within a developing world setting 
– that could lead to human contact with 
waste material contaminated with Ebola 
virus and so provide the opportunity for 
transmission of the virus to another per-
son. Taking into account the likely viral 
load of the contaminated material and 
based on the frequency with which each 
hazard was likely to occur, we grouped 
the hazards into high-, medium- and 
low-risk categories.
Following the validation of each 
flow diagram, the research team de-
termined appropriate critical control 
points – i.e. the points at which there is 
an opportunity to reduce or eliminate 
the risks of virus transmission. The team 
then made so-called critical limits, for 
each identified critical control point, us-
ing a combination of expert knowledge 
– followed by validation via examination 
of the relevant published data on the 
epidemiology, prevention and control 
of Ebola virus disease – and the current 
relevant recommendations of Médecins 
Sans Frontières and the World Health 
Organization (WHO).
Recommendations
We used the results of the analysis to 
develop recommendations for the man-
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agement of waste produced in the care 
of cases of Ebola virus disease.
Results
Hazard analysis
Our assessment of waste disposal within 
developing world settings affected by 
Ebola virus disease revealed multiple 
hazardous practices linked to the col-
lection, transportation, disposal, clean-
ing and storage of waste (Table 1). We 
believe that, if managed poorly, each of 
these practices presents an unaccept-
able level of risk of the transmission of 
Ebola virus. All the practices that we 
categorized as high-risk involved po-
tential contamination with blood: the 
collection, transportation, cleaning and 
shared use of blood-soiled fomites and 
the shared use of latrines contaminated 
with blood or bloodied faeces (Table 1). 
The practices identified as medium-risk 
were the collection and transportation of 
material contaminated with bodily fluids 
other than blood, the shared use of la-
trines soiled with such fluids, the clean-
ing and shared use of fomites soiled with 
such fluids and the contamination of the 
environment during the collection and 
transportation of blood-contaminated 
waste (Table 1). All of the other activities 
and practices linked to waste disposal 
were deemed to present a lower level 
of risk of the transmission of the virus.
Control points and limits
We identified 13 critical control points 
– i.e. 13 points at which there is an op-
portunity to adopt measures to reduce 
the risks of transmission. For each such 
point, following extensive consultation 
and cross-referencing with the existing 
literature, one or more potential hazards 
were identified. Then, one or more sets 
of recommendations were made for 
reducing the risk presented by each 
identified hazard (Table 1). All of the 
critical control points identified could be 
assigned to one of five categories: waste 
collection, waste transportation, waste 
disposal, waste storage or waste clean-
ing. The recommendations that we made 
for each critical control point derive 
from a combination of basic infection 
control – e.g. employing thorough hand 
hygiene measures – Ebola virus-specific 
recommendations produced following 
consultation with the existing literature 
and suggested behaviour changes that 
could reduce the chances of a person 
exposing themselves to increased trans-
mission risk.
Several of the recommendations we 
made include fundamental aspects of in-
fection prevention and control – e.g. the 
correct and proper use of full personal 
protective equipment, appropriate hand 
hygiene and thorough cleaning followed 
by the use of an appropriate disinfectant.
Discussion
We used analysis based on the Hazard 
Analysis of Critical Control Points 
framework to make recommendations 
for protecting health workers, other staff 
in health facilities and the wider public 
from the risks posed by the disposal 
of potentially infected liquid and solid 
waste generated in the care and treat-
ment of patients infected with Ebola 
virus. During this analysis, 13 critical 
control points associated with the col-
lection, transportation, disposal, storage 
and cleaning of waste, the use and emp-
tying of latrines and fomite reuse were 
identified. Our analysis took account 
of existing evidence presented in the 
published literature and guidance pub-
lished by international organizations. 
When there were no or few relevant data 
available, expert opinion from an inter-
national panel of experts with expertise 
in environmental health, epidemiology, 
health-care provision in low-income 
countries, virology and water and sanita-
tion engineering was sought.
The framework allows for a rapid 
identification of the risks associated with 
a known hazard.13 In the present study, 
that known hazard was the transmis-
sion of Ebola virus between humans. 
The 2014–2016 Ebola virus disease 
outbreak resulted in widespread local-
ized transmission of the virus. Much of 
this transmission was attributed to the 
social, environmental and cultural char-
acteristics of the worst-affected coun-
tries,10 including inadequate health-care 
infrastructures that, even before the 
outbreak, were under great stress as 
the result of high population densi-
ties in urban areas.31,32 For Ebola virus 
disease, multiple gaps still exist in our 
understanding of potential transmission 
mechanisms and control measures.10 In 
the context of such knowledge gaps, the 
framework provides a useful systematic 
approach that focuses on the prevention 
of harm and synthesizes hard evidence 
and expert opinion.15 Given such knowl-
edge gaps, however, it remains possible 
that future research may produce results 
that require our current recommenda-
tions to be modified.
Previous studies have shown that 
direct contact with a symptomatic per-
son with Ebola virus disease is typically 
associated with relatively low risk of 
transmission during the early stages of 
the disease – whereas the risk of indirect 
transmission increases as the disease 
progresses. 11,33,34 The transmission of 
the virus during burial rituals – which 
fall outside the scope of the present 
study – are known to be particularly 
hazardous practices. 11,33,34 The transport 
and disposal of potentially contaminated 
waste also present opportunities for the 
virus to leave the household or care cen-
tre and enter the wider community or 
environment. In our analysis, taking into 
account the likely viral load within the 
contaminated waste and the likely op-
portunity for transmission of the virus 
via a particular activity, we only associ-
ated activities involving blood-soiled 
waste with relatively high risks of Ebola 
virus transmission. For blood-soiled 
waste, the highest risks were associated 
with activities that could bring the waste 
into direct contact with either another 
person – e.g. the cleaning of a blood-
contaminated container – or a potential 
viral vehicle – e.g. a container used to 
transport bloodied waste or a contami-
nated fomite passed to another person 
without being adequately cleaned. Each 
of these risks could be eliminated or, at 
least, substantially decreased through 
the careful implementation of the rec-
ommendations outlined in Table 1. As 
there is some evidence to suggest that 
spraying a potentially contaminated 
surface with disinfectant may promote 
transmission,35 we recommend contain-
ment of the spill, followed by cleaning 
of the surface with water and detergent 
and finally wiping with 0.5% chlorine 
solution. This recommendation, which 
follows published guidelines, 18,19,36 was 
kept relatively simple because many of 
those undertaking the cleaning and the 
preparation of solutions for disinfecting 
within non-clinical settings would not 
be able to record times or determine 
chemical concentrations accurately.
Ebola virus can rarely be detected in 
the faeces or rectal swabs from persons 
with Ebola virus disease, even dur-
ing periods of acute illness, 12,37–39 and 
little is known about the persistence of 
the virus within faeces.11 With this in 
mind, we considered faeces to be less 
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of a transmission risk than blood. It has 
been estimated that approximately one 
in four samples of non-blood bodily 
fluids collected during active illness was 
likely to contain viable virus.14 It remains 
possible that these non-blood bodily 
fluids only contain Ebola virus when 
contaminated with non-visible blood.
Whenever fomite-related transmis-
sion has been suspected, it has rarely 
been possible to exclude the possibility 
of direct human-to-human contact as 
the transmission route.9 We considered 
the risks of transmission via food crops 
and via disposal of waste directly onto 
the ground to be low – primarily because 
of the lack of evidence of such transmis-
sion40 but also because solar radiation 
and other environmental stressors, 
such as antiviral microbial activity in 
soils, may rapidly inactivate the virus. 
However, it is worth noting that there is 
evidence highlighting contact with raw 
sewage as a transmission route for many 
other pathogens.41 Previous research 
into filoviruses has shown that, on clear 
days at tropical latitudes, it can take as 
little as 20 min to decrease the infectivity 
of sun-exposed virus by 90%.42 Although 
some researchers have been concerned 
about the potential risk to wastewater 
workers posed by viable Ebola virus 
in sewer systems,43 others believe that 
any predisposal treatment of sewage 
that would be potentially contaminated 
with Ebola virus could increase the 
transmission risk.44 Although some 
Ebola virus survived more than two days 
in sterilized wastewater,45 the United 
States Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention believes that standard per-
sonal protective equipment for sewage 
workers provides sufficient protection.30
In conclusion, our analysis has 
shown that, while there is limited rel-
evant literature, waste from the care of 
cases of Ebola virus disease should not 
be discounted as a potential transmis-
sion route. The cleaning, collection, 
disposal, storage and transportation of 
waste contaminated with blood prob-
ably present the greatest waste-related 
transmission risks, particularly when 
the blood has come from a person in 
the advanced stages of the disease. We 
believe that waste contaminated with 
other bodily fluids poses a substan-
tially lower transmission risk, which 
decreases further with time after con-
tamination. However, it is important 
to keep in mind that our analysis was 
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virus disease outbreak. This outbreak 
was unusual because it expanded into 
densely populated urban centres and 
there was sustained transmission of the 
virus within such environments. Previ-
ous outbreaks of Ebola virus disease 
have predominantly occurred in small, 
rural communities where containment 
and isolation were more feasible. The 
2014–2016 outbreak was far larger than 
any previously recorded outbreak and 
it is possible that the elevated quantity 
of virus entering the environment may 
yet reveal transmission routes that have 
gone undetected or unnoticed in previ-
ous outbreaks. In the meantime, our 
recommendations should be followed 
to ensure that the potential for Ebola 
virus transmission via waste materials 
is minimized. ■
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 ةيشربلا  تايافنلا  نم  صلختلاب  ةطبترلما  رطاخلما  مييقت  ضرغلا
 تاعمتجلما لخاد رطاخلما هذه لثم نم فيفختلل تايصوت عضوو
.لاوبيلإا سويرف شيفت تلااح نم نياعت يتلا
 لمعلا  راطإ  عم  لماعتلا  في  ينسرمتلما  نم  قيرف  ماق  بولسلأا
 لىإ  ةراشلإاب  ةجرلحا  مكحتلا  طاقن  في  رطاخلما  ليلحتب  صالخا
 سويرف  ضرمب  ينباصملل  ةيحصلا  ةياعرلا  نع  ةتجانلا  تايافنلا
 قفدت  تاططمخ  مسرب  اوماقو  ،رطخلل  اًردصم  اهرابتعاب  لاوبيلإا
 تاططخلما كلت رابتخاب اوماق ماك ،ةرطلخا جتاونلا هذه ءوشن حضوت
 في ةوطخ لكب ةطبترلما ةلمتحلما رطاخلما دسر دعبو .اهيلع ديكأتلاو
 ،رطاخلما ليلتح ءارجإب قيرفلا ماق ،قفدتلا تاططمخ نم ططمخ لك
 انهأش نم يتلا  تايصوتلا  عضوو ،ةجرلحا مكحتلا  طاقن  ديدتحو
.مكحتلا طاقن نم ةطقن لك في ىودعلا رطامخ نم فيفختلا
 اهلقنو مدلاب ةخستلما ةيدعلما تاودلأا عجم تايلمع نأ ودبي جئاتنلا
 كترشلما  مادختسلاا  كلذكو  ،اله  كترشلما  مادختسلااو  اهفيظنتو
 عافترا  ثودحب  طبترت  ىمدلما  زابرلا  وأ  مدلاب  ةثوللما  ضيحارملل
 لىعو  .لاوبيلإا  سويرف  لاقتنلا  رطلخا  تايوتسم  في  سوملم
 دق  رطاخلما  نم  ًلاادتعا  رثكلأا  تايوتسلما  تناك  ،رخلآا  بنالجا
 ىرخلأا مسلجا لئاوسب ةثوللما داولما لقنو عجم تايلمعب تطبترا
 هذه  لثمب  ةخستلما  ضيحارملل  كترشلما  مادختسلااو  ،مدلا  يرغ
 تاودلأل  كترشلما  مادختسلااو  فيظنتلا  تايلمعو  ،لئاوسلا
 لقنو عجم ءانثأ  ةئيبلا  ثولتو ،لئاوسلا  هذه لثمب ةخستلما  ةيدعلما
.مدلاب ةثوللما تايافنلا
 قلعتلما  لاوبيلإا  سويرف  لاقتنا  رطخ  ضفخ  نكمي  جاتنتسلاا
 ،ةلماكلا  ةيصخشلا ةيمالحا تادعم مادختسا قيرط نع تايافنلاب
 دعب  بسانم  رهطم  عضوو  ،نيديلل  ةبسانلما  ةفاظنلاب  مماتهلااو
 راطإ  لىع دماتعلاا دوقي  نأ  نكملما  نمف ،كلذلو .ةيانعب  فيظنتلا
 يرسيت لىإ ةجرلحا مكحتلا طاقن في رطاخلما ليلحتب صالخا لمعلا






















Recommandations pour le traitement des déchets contaminés par le virus Ebola – une approche avec la méthode d’analyse des 
risques et maîtrise des points critiques (HACCP)
Objectif Évaluer, au sein des communautés touchées par des flambées 
de maladie à virus Ebola, les risques liés à l’élimination des déchets et 
excreta humains et formuler des recommandations pour limiter ces 
risques.
Méthodes Une équipe expérimentée dans l’application de la méthode 
d’analyse des risques et maîtrise des points critiques (HACCP) a identifié 
les déchets issus des activités de soin prodiguées aux personnes 
infectées par le virus Ebola et a élaboré, testé et confirmé plusieurs 
diagrammes des opérations illustrant la génération de ces déchets. 
Après avoir répertorié les risques potentiels associés à chaque étape de 
chaque diagramme, l’équipe a mené une analyse des risques, identifié 
les points critiques pour leur maîtrise et préparé des recommandations 
pour réduire les risques de transmission à chaque point de maîtrise.
Résultats La collecte, le transport, le nettoyage et l’utilisation partagée 
de fomites maculés de sang ainsi que l’utilisation partagée de latrines 
souillées par du sang ou des fèces contenant du sang semblent 
être associés à des niveaux de risque de transmission du virus Ebola 
particulièrement élevés. Des niveaux de risque plus modérés sont 
associés à la collecte et au transport d’équipements souillés par des 
fluides corporels autres que le sang, à l’utilisation partagé de latrines 
souillées par ce type de fluides, au nettoyage et à l’utilisation partagée 
de fomites souillés par ce type de fluides ainsi qu’à la contamination 
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de l’environnement pendant la collecte et le transport de déchets 
tachés de sang.
Conclusion Le risque de transmission du virus Ebola par des déchets 
pourrait être réduit par l’utilisation d’équipements de protection 
individuelle complets, par une hygiène des mains appropriée et par 
l’application d’un désinfectant adapté après un nettoyage scrupuleux. 
L’utilisation de la méthode d’analyse des risques et maîtrise des points 
critiques (HACCP) pourrait aider à réagir rapidement en cas de flambée 
de maladies infectieuses émergentes.
Резюме
Рекомендации по обращению с отходами, зараженными вирусом Эбола: анализ риска на основе 
критических контрольных показателей
Цель Провести оценку рисков в связи с утилизацией человеческих 
отходов в общинах, страдающих от вспышек эпидемии лихорадки 
Эбола, и составить рекомендации для снижения таких рисков.
Методы Группа специалистов, обладающих опытом в анализе 
риска на основе критических контрольных показателей, 
определила отходы, которые образуются в результате 
ухода за заразившимися вирусом Эбола, спроектировала и 
протестировала блок-схемы, иллюстрирующие образование 
таких отходов, и подтвердила их правильность. Перечислив 
потенциальные риски, сопряженные с каждым этапом каждой 
блок-схемы, группа специалистов осуществила анализ риска, 
определила критические контрольные показатели и составила 
рекомендации для снижения риска передачи по каждому 
контрольному показателю.
Результаты Было определено, что сбор, транспортировка, очистка 
и коллективное использование загрязненных кровью фомитов и 
коллективное использование уборных, загрязненных кровью или 
калом с кровью, ассоциируются с чрезвычайно высоким риском 
передачи вируса Эбола. Менее высокий уровень риска был 
связан со сбором и транспортировкой материала, загрязненного 
биологическими жидкостями, отличными от крови, совместным 
использованием уборных, содержащих такие жидкости, очисткой 
и совместным использованием фомитов, загрязненных такими 
жидкостями, а также с загрязнением окружающей среды при 
сборе и транспортировке отходов, загрязненных кровью.
Вывод Риск передачи вируса Эбола, присутствующего в 
отходах, может быть снижен путем использования полного 
комплекта средств индивидуальной защиты, следования 
правилам надлежащей гигиены рук и применения подходящего 
дезинфицирующего средства после тщательной очистки. 
Проведение анализа риска на основе критических контрольных 
показателей могло бы способствовать быстрому реагированию 
на вспышки эпидемии нового инфекционного заболевания.
Resumen
Recomendaciones para tratar desechos contaminados con el virus del Ebola: un análisis de peligros en puntos críticos de control
Objetivo Evaluar, dentro de las comunidades que han sufrido brotes 
del virus del Ebola, los riesgos relacionados con la eliminación de los 
desechos humanos y redactar recomendaciones para mitigarlos.
Métodos Un equipo con experiencia en el análisis de peligros en puntos 
críticos de control identificó productos de desecho generados por el 
cuidado de individuos infectados con el virus del Ebola y construyó, 
probó y confirmó diagramas de flujo que mostraban la creación de 
dichos productos. Tras redactar una lista de los potenciales peligros 
relacionados con cada paso de cada diagrama de flujo, el equipo realizó 
un análisis de peligros, determinó los puntos críticos de control y creó 
recomendaciones para mitigar los riesgos de contagio en todos los 
puntos de control.
Resultados La recolección, el transporte, la limpieza y el uso 
común de fómites contaminados con sangre y el uso común de 
letrinas contaminadas con sangre o heces con sangre parecían estar 
relacionados con riesgos especialmente elevados de contagio del 
virus del Ebola. Unos niveles de riesgo más moderados se relacionaron 
con la recolección y el transporte de material contaminado con fluidos 
corporales distintos a la sangre, el uso común de letrinas sucias con 
dichos fluidos, la limpieza y el uso de fómites contaminados con dichos 
fluidos y la contaminación del entorno durante la recolección y el 
transporte de desperdicios impregnados en sangre.
Conclusión El riesgo de contagio del virus del Ébola en relación con 
los desechos podría verse reducido mediante el uso de un equipo de 
protección individual completo, una higiene de las manos adecuada 
y un desinfectante apropiado tras una limpieza exhaustiva. El uso del 
análisis de peligros en puntos críticos de control podría proporcionar una 
rápida respuesta ante brotes de enfermedades contagiosas emergentes.
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